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COMMENT: INHERENT INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY*
Jessie D. Green and Susan Work
Inherent sovereignty is the most basic principle of all Indian law
and means simply that the powers lawfully vested in an Indian tribe
are those powers that predate New World discovery and have never
been extinguished.1 Some of the powers of inherent sovereignty
which have been recognized by the courts are the right to determine
a form of government,2 the power to determine membership, 3 the
application of Indian customs, laws, and tribal jurisdiction to do-
mestic relations4 and descent and distribution of property,5 power
of taxation,6 exclusion of nonmembers from tribal territory,7 power
over tribal property,8 rights of occupancy in tribal lands,9 jurisdiction
over property of members, 10 and administration of justice."' Wheth-
er tribal sovereignty exists by the grace of courteous regard for the
past by the courts, or by the rights of historical precedent ratified in
treaties and statutes by Congress, it is an important past and present
force which sets the Native American people apart from their fellow
Americans.12
Even though no specific federal statute, constitutional provision,
or executive order establishes or reiterates the concept of inherent
Indian sovereignty, it has been plainly stated by the Supreme Court
to exist.' 3 Having deep historical roots, the inherent sovereignty doc-
trine has been recognized by the Court as the ordinary, if not the uni-
form, interpretation of the basis of Indian tribal power.' 4 The doc-
trine has been challenged as a mere tool used to justify decisions, in
essence making inherent Indian sovereignty a legal fiction of the
courts. Nevertheless, such a view is not readily reflected in the rea-
soning of recent Court decisions' 6 and is in direct contradiction to
the opinions of many learned writers. Moreover, a denial of the
legal validity of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty ignores or fails to
consider that such sovereignty has in fact been exercised by the
tribes,'" resulting in the preservation of a communal culture in the
face of the adverse individualist influences presented by the domi-
nant culture.'9
The legal fiction idea bears examination because it points out that
to a large extent the perpetuation of the sovereignty doctrine rests
on governmental branches other than the courts. The court may
hear only those matters where it has jurisdiction, and often that
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jurisdiction is obtained only by the Congress conferring it.20 Further-
more, it has long been the rule of the courts to follow the decisions
of other governmental branches whose special duty is determination
of the recognition of an Indian group as a tribe.21 Thus, if other
governmental branches refuse to recognize an Indian group as a
tribe, the courts will find no tribal sovereignty to be protected. These
factors mean that to a large extent the sovereignty doctrine rests on
the support of the executive and legislative governmental branches
and without that support, tribal sovereignty would cease to be men-
tioned in court opinions and relegated to die a slow death in the
speculating minds of knowledgeable writers. The slow death has not
occurred. On the contrary, tribal sovereignty has been recognized
and endorsed in several recent opinions, 2 illustrating the historical
strength of the doctrine.
Historical Roots of Sovereignty in Case Law
The problem of jurisdiction has plagued Indian tribes from
earliest history. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,23 the Supreme Court
held that Indian tribes were not foreign nations in the constitutional
sense and that Indian tribes were as a consequence without the juris-
diction of federal courts when suing a state. 4 The decision construed
Indian nations as having a peculiar and unique status in relation to
the United States resembling "that of a ward to his guardian.12 Also,
the court declared that Indian nations were so completely under the
sovereignty of the United States that any attempt by a foreign power
to acquire their lands would be viewed as a direct act of hostility
against the United States.2" Cherokee Nation v. Georgia27 relegated
Indian nations to an absolutely dependent position in the legal
redress of wrongs, for sovereign immunity protected the states and
the United States from suit by an Indian nation in the absence of
legislation to the contrary.' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia2 disposed
of the question of whether an Indian nation could exercise sovereign
power in the national sense and began the controversy of what sov-
ereign power an Indian tribe could possess.
Worcester v. Georgia"0 is considered the leading case in the field
of Indian sovereignty. Coming shortly after Cherokee Nation V.
Georgia,"' Worcester primarily represented the struggle of an Indian
nation to retain self-government in the face of state encroachment.3 2
Although Worcester reaffirmed the dictum of Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia8 that Indians were subject to federal control, 4 it pointed
out that the subjection was wholly in accord with the doctrine of the
law of nations whereby a weaker power does not surrender its right
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to self-government by association with a stronger power and by tak-
ing its protection.8 Moreover, the Worcester holding spoke directly
to the continuing struggle of states and Indian nations by holding
that a state has no power over an Indian tribe and that the whole
intercourse between Indian nations and all of the states is governed
by the Constitution and laws of the federal government.3
6
To reach the aforementioned decision, Chief Justice Marshall in
Worcester reflected on the roots of Indian sovereignty that pre-
existed the United States.3 7 Marshall stated that the rights of Euro-
pean discoverers to the land which they "discovered" gave only the
exclusive right to purchase from those natives who wished to sell as
among Europeans, and that those rights were not founded on the
denial of any Indian rights.38 Worcester viewed the idea that Euro-
pean charters gave the exclusive right to govern as absurd and ex-
travagant,39 and stated that such grants of power and title between
and among Europeans were blank paper so far as Indians were con-
cerned.40
Looking back on the history of the United States, Chief justice
Marshall commented that because Indian tribes were nations in the
sense that they were capable of war, peace, and self-government,
treaties were sought and obtained by Congress to avoid hostilities
and cement friendships.41 To construe such treaties by the United
States or its predecessors in interest as a surrender of sovereign In-
dian rights would, in Marshall's language, "be a perversion of their
[treaties'] necessary meaning, and a departure from the construction
which has been uniformly put on them. '42 Worcester explains that
both the treaties and laws of the United States contemplate com-
plete separation between states and Indian nations43 and provide
for the respect and protection of Indian rights by the federal gov-
ernment.
44
Worcester has not remained untouched by time, but Williams
v. Lee43 recognized that the basic policy is still relevant.46 Construing
the Worcester doctrine, the Court stated that "essentially, absent
governing acts of Congress, the question has always been whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."47 Following this reasoning,
the Williams Court denied a state court the power to adjudicate a
sale between an Indian and a non-Indian, because it would under-
mine the authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs.48 The
Court was not blind to the then existing legally sanctioned exercises
of state law over Indian reservations and territory, but distinguished
those instances by pointing out that such control by state courts
involved non-Indians.4 9
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Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones0 stressed that the conceptual
clarity of Worcester has given way to more individualized treatment
of Indians.5' Whereas Williams reflected the continuing aspects of
Mr. Marshall's opinion in Worcester, Mescalero presented the image
of the differences between past and present construction. Mescalero
endorsed the Williams infringement test, but rested its decision that
a tribe's ski resort was subject to a state gross receipts tax on the basis
that it was construing a tax matter as to an Indian activity off the
reservation.5 2 McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,"8 noted in
Mescalero,5 4 recognized that some state tax action cases do not turn
on the Indian sovereignty doctrine;5 however, it held that inherent
Indian sovereignty precluded state taxation of activities or lands
within reservation boundaries absent congressional consent.5 Mc-
Clanahan, in speaking to the individual treatment concept of Mes-
calero, pointed to a test used in the past57 to determine whether an
Indian tribe is subject to state control. The determination depended
on whether an Indian tribe had preserved its tribal organization and
was recognized by the federal government as a distinct people.,8 Ac-
cording to the Court, this test still has usefulness, even though other
factors are also involved in decisions concerning tribal sovereignty.5
Although the McClanahan Court noted that the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty expounded in Worcester has undergone considerable
evolution, 6 the doctrine was construed to be relevant as a backdrop
for the reading of relevant treaties and federal statutes.01 The Court
further enforced such reasoning by full endorsement of the Williams
infringement test.62
Inapplicability of Constitutional Restrictions on Tribal Action
Even though the doctrine of inherent Indian sovereignty may have
been modified since Worcester, federal courts have refused to extend
constitutional restrictions over Indian tribal activities and have ad-
hered strictly to inherent sovereignty as the reason for such a stead-
fast position.6" Elk v. Williams6 4 stated that general acts of Congress
do not apply to Indian tribes unless a clear manifest intent is so
expressed. 65 With such a background, consistency required that gen-
eral constitutional provisions receive the same treatment.0 Thus, in
Talton v. Mayes67 the Court held that Indian nations were not sub-
ject to fifth or fourteenth amendment restrictions." Talton's con-
clusion was the logical extension of tribal sovereignty" and case
wording clearly explained that the decision rested on inherent Indian
sovereignty.70 By setting out that the origin of tribal power does not
spring from the United States, Talton presented a case which con-
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tinued the reliance on the Worcester doctrine and emphasized that
Indian tribes are not federal entities.7 1 Even though Talton was de-
cided some time ago, more recent opinions indicate that its decision
has remained intact.72
In 1968 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act.1 3 Ex-
pressing concern that individual Indians had no personal rights in
situations involving conflicts between the tribe and the individual, 74
Congress by statute enumerated specific rights which are not to be
abridged by tribal government. These rights are those found in
amendments one, four, five, six, seven, and eight of the United States
Bill of Rights, with some variations. 5 The Act also contained the re-
quirement that a tribe will not deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws and a prohibition against bill
of attainder and ex post facto laws.7 6
This Indian Bill of Rights was an infringement on tribal sov-
ereignty and has been criticized, particularly because it did not allow
for tribal consent to its application. But some of the lower federal
courts have indicated that there is nothing in the Act showing that
Congress intended to sweep aside the doctrine of Indian sovereign-
ty.78 Following this observation, the Fourth Circuit in Crowe -V.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc.,79 held that although the
Cherokee tribal action was properly set aside for failure to comply
with due process and equal protection, the district court was not em-
powered by the Act to go further and substitute its judgment on the
merits for that of the tribe. The court emphasized that the con-
troversy, which involved tribal lands, was not to be resolved by the
common law, but in light of the traditions and customs of the Indian
tribe, 0 and remanded the case to the tribal court.
A literal reading of the due process and equal protection provisions
in the Indian Bill of Rights to mean the same standards as applied
to state and federal governments could result in seriously undermin-
ing the tribes' cultural autonomy."' Some courts have found different
standards applicable, while others have indicated that traditional
Anglo standards are appropriate.82 The ultimate development of a
rule in this area will be determinative of the extent to which tribal
sovereignty has been undermined by the restrictions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.3 Some courts have reasoned that, in effect, it
waived tribal sovereign immunity, and by virtue of the equal pro-
tection and due process clause, granted the courts subject matter
jurisdiction over matters previously characterized as internal affairs
beyond the federal courts' jurisdiction. 4 Thus, the full impact of
the Indian Bill of Rights on tribal sovereignty is yet to be deter-
mined.
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Federal Control Over Indian Sovereignty
As surely as Worcester established inherent Indian sovereignty as
a bar to state interference with Indian self-government, Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,85 decided before it, established the federal gov-
ernment as a superior authority over Indian nations.80 Although this
conclusion may have had its foundation in pure coercion, it is doubt-
ful whether a challenge to its legitimacy would succeed.87 Court
holdings have long indicated that Indians do not exercise sovereignty
of the same nature as that exercised by the federal government or
even by the states.88 Standing in the peculiar position of an Indian
tribe under the Constitution,89 an Indian tribe in effect bears the
same relationship to the federal government as a territory in that it
is a secondary government which may exercise complete jurisdiction
over its members within its boundaries, subordinate only to the ex-
pressed limitations of federal law.90
The Nature of Plenary Power
The control exercised by Congress over Indian tribes is so exten-
sive that characterization of such power as plenary is justified.,1 Al-
though plenary power is generally considered to originate from the
wardship status, the commerce clause, and treaty implication, courts
have not defined its exact origin. 2 Worcester stated that Indian
tribes were within the ambit of federal supervision, 3 but plenary
power is more far-reaching. After review of previous cases 4 and con-
sideration of the impact of the mention of Indian tribes in the com-
merce clause,95 United States v. Kagama,0 relying on Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia9d 7 reasoning, held that the wardship status of Indians
formed a basis for invoking the power of Congress to make criminal
laws applicable to Indian tribes for the Indians' own protection.08
The opinion in Kagama, however, was carefully worded and did not
preclude use of the commerce clause as a foundation for congres-
sional action in the proper situation. 9
Although Kagama reached beyond the holding in both Cherokee
Nation and Worcester and embroidered on the dictum of those
cases, it did not reach as far as Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.100 In dis-
cussion of the plenary power of Congress over Indians, Lone Wolf
stated that Congress had exercised the power over Indians from the
very beginning and that the power is of a political nature not subject
to judicial control or review. 1 1 This Lone Wolf dictum points out
that where important questions of plenary power are involved, the
Court may describe the issues presented as political in nature and
decline to adjudicate the matter.10 2
316
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Although the plenary power of Congress over Indians is of a
broad nature, it is not absolute. 10 3 Plenary power is only a complete
power when exercised completely, and therein lies tribal sovereignty.
The statutes of Congress only operate as limitations rather than
determinations. 10 4 What is not expressly limited or expressly abro-
gated remains within the domain of Indian determination by virtue
of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. 10 5
Vague or doubtful inferences drawn from congressional action do
not extend to take away Indian sovereignty. 106 Good faith is de-
manded on the part of the United States in all exercises of control
and management of Indian affairs.'0 7 Even Worcester noted that
the language of treaties was to be construed as understood by the
Indians, rather than according to the technical meaning of words as
understood by legal minds. 0 Under no circumstances is treaty lan-
guage to be construed to Indian prejudice. 0 9 This same high degree
of good faith extends to congressional action in the field of statute
making as well as the area of treaty ratification. All statutes which
affect Indian tribes are to be liberally construed with all questionable
expressions being resolved in the Indians' favor.110 True, the plenary
power of Congress is broad, but the good faith implied in all con-
gressional action serves to have the court act with forbearance when
any congressional action might infringe on an Indian tribe's inherent
sovereignty.
The good faith demands of the exercise of plenary power is supple-
mented by the demand that all legislation be designed for the pro-
tection and best interests of Indians."' Kagama, which pointed to
wardship as at least one basis of the plenary power of Congress,
stressed that protection was a duty of Congress arising from the
Indians' own inability to protect themselves due to intercourse with
the federal government."2 Lone Wolf extended Kagama's view of
legislative power by stating that Congress had the power to govern
Indians by direct statute, and pointed out that such legislation must
be in the best interest of the Indians themselves. 3 An example of
good faith, protection, and best interest demands is seen in Kennerly
v. District Court."4 There Congress passed a measure which would
allow a state to extend its laws over Indian tribes and reservations."15
Kennerly, stating that Congress had not expressly extended state
jurisdiction, held that the state had not complied with the explicit
requirements of the act and denied the state jurisdiction. The de-
mands of good faith, protection, and best interests toward Indians
in legislation require exacting compliance with congressional action
before plenary power seriously infringes on the concept of tribal self-
government.
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If, on the other hand, the requirements set out by Congress are
explicitly followed by states and Congress expresses an intent to
abrogate Indian sovereignty, then at that time the plenary power
would be absolute. There seems to be no doubt that Congress could
abolish Indian tribes immediately if it saw fit."" It has long been
pointed out by the courts that Congress may directly overrule treaty
provisions. 117 The other party to the treaty could have an action for
breach of the agreement, but only if the United States submits itself
to the jurisdiction of a legal forum where the cause may be heard and
judgment rendered." 8 The old case law which points out that Con-
gress may terminate a tribe directs that such be done in good faith
on the part of Congress, with Indian protection and the Indians'
best interests in mind.1 9 Nevertheless, the forum problem may well
prevent any court adjudication of such, for in Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock 20 it was stated that the courts presume the perfect good faith
of Congress.' 2' The plenary power of Congress is certainly broad,
but it is not absolute until absolutely exercised and for the present
there is no such explicit action contemplated by Congress. 22
Constitutional Sources of Plenary Power
The plenary power of Congress over Indian tribes arises at least
in part from the constitutional powers of Congress to ratify treaties,
to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, and to admit new
states. 23 Worcester referred to the constitutional powers involved
in treaty-making 24 and commerce regulation 125 as the authorization
of exclusive federal control over Indian nations. 20 Further, the con-
stitutional power of Congress to admit new states 27 has allowed the
federal government to retain exclusive power, because Congress, by
enabling act legislation, has forced new states to deny any claim of
jurisdiction over Indian affairs .'2
History, as well as the Constitution, indicates that the federal gov-
ernment has exclusive and absolute treaty powers. 29 This is a source
of the plenary power of Congress, but the primary source is consid-
ered to be the commerce clause.8 0 The commerce clause authorizes
Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but the ques-
tion of the exclusiveness of the nature of that federal power has been
questioned on occasion by states.' 3' Such questioning has been vig-
orously answered by the Court, which held that the congressional
power was both exclusive of state action and absolute in its field of
exercise. 32 United States v. Nice 33 construed the exercise of com-
merce control to be exclusively vested in the federal government by
virtue of the commerce clause of the Constitution and the wardship
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status expounded in Kagama.3 Moreover, if the wardship status of
Indians has always existed, as Kagama implies, 135 then it is possible
that all constitutional sources of plenary power over Indians are
derivatives of that status.
Whether the wardship status of Indians is responsible for the con-
stitutional provisions, the constitutional provisions responsible for
wardship, or a third force responsible for creating the two former, it
remains that wardship provides Congress with virtually unlimited
power over Indians.136 With roots in Cherokee Nation,187 explana-
tion in Kagama,138 and extrapolation in Lone Wolf, 39 wardship has
emerged as a broad, well-documented concept consisting of the pe-
culiar relation of Indians and the federal government which justifies
federal protection.140 Wardship, with its potential for Indian abuse14 '
as well as Indian benefit, 42 has left one area less than fully defined:
whether wardship is a federal duty borne of choice or of obligation.
Kagama, in its early explanation of wardship, said that the duty
"must" exist with the federal government because Indian weakness
was due in large to intercourse with the federal government. 43
Board of County Commissioners v. Seber, 44 in construing Kagama,
stated that the duty was assumed by the federal government of neces-
sity. 45 However, such a recognition of duty was commensurate with
an immediate need for protection. 46 And the Court in later dictum
pointed out that it was within congressional power to choose when
the wardship status would cease to exist. 47 The power of wardship
termination would be consistent with the plenary power of Congress,
but the recent decision of Williams v. Lee 48 states that Indian inde-
pendence was "exchanged" for federal protection. 49 Consistent with
such an exchange concept is the implication of an agreement or
contract, which might form a basis for an unending wardship duty.
However the nature of the duty of wardship is viewed, whether of
choice or of obligation, it is a presently continuing rather than an
extinguished method of federal supervision and protection of the
Indian tribes. Although some treatise writers feel the government
has wearied of its role as guardian, 5 ° appropriations statutes indicate
otherwise.'5' Moreover, the Court has pointed out that as long as the
federal government recognizes the Indian tribes as possessing attri-
butes of national character or attributes of the tribal relationship, the
wardship status continues.5 2 Furthermore, the conferring of rights
and privileges on Indians does not change the wardship situation. 58
Although In re Hef 54 stated that once citizenship is granted to
Indians they are outside federal control, the Court by specific refer-
ence later overruled such a stand,'5 5 because congressional intent
reflected by later enactments was not as the Court had earlier in-
319
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terpreted.156 The on/off status of wardship in this era was confusing,
to say the least,15 7 especially when allotment in severalty was ad-
judged not to affect Indian guardianship.5 8 Citizenship rights were
conferred on all Indians born in the United States after 19z4,11 and
if the In re Heft ruling had continued to be enforced, the special
relationship of the American Indian with the federal government
and possibly Indian sovereignty might well have been relegated to a
historical study. But because Indian wardship has continued, Indian
sovereignty has continued, and Indian citizenship has been granted,
the Native American has a tripartite status unique in American so-
ciety.160
All in all, federal control over Indian tribes is awesome. On occa-
sion Congress has even disbanded tribes,16 thus terminating their
recognition by the federal government, which includes court stand-
ing and wardship protection. Even the direct constitutional control
over commerce with Indian tribes is unavailing to protect Indian
tribes from state encroachment, if the tribal relationship is no longer
recognized. Nevertheless, for that awesome power to be felt it must
be exercised and as long as the federal government refrains from
the exercise of the power of termination, inherent Indian sovereign-
ty can be a powerful force.
Inherent Sovereignty in a Historical Perspective
Court decisions rarely, if ever, give voice to a completely original
doctrine, and inherent Indian sovereignty is no different. As the
Court pointed out in Worcester, the origin of Indian sovereignty
reaches to roots which predate European discovery of the North
American continent. 62 There seems little doubt that at one time
Indians were in fact completely independent sovereign entities.10
The British treated the Indian nations as sovereigns' and the Amer-
icans initially followed their example, although primarily as a war
measure. 65 Implicit in that treatment by the negotiation of treaties
was the notion of the independence of Indian tribes. 00 Noting the
subject matter of treaties-war powers, 0 7 boundary and frontier
regulation,6 s passports,'16 and extradition7 0-_it is easily understood
that the treaties are indicative of an international rather than na-
tional relationship.' 7'
Generally, until the year 1 829, the federal government continued
to act under the traditions of a time when colonists were contending
with the tribes for possession of the continent, and dealt with them
under principles of international law.'72 But, there were indications
of a policy change earlier, in fact some authors point out that the
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change actually began immediately after the Revolution.173 Con-
gress unilaterally regulated trade and intercourse with Indians for
the first time in 1790.174 Such regulation did not necessarily impinge
on Indian independence, for the regulations may be construed as a
limit on the intercourse United States citizens were allowed with
Indians and an action akin to the requirement of passports for entry
into Indian country.175 In 1817 Congress passed a measure which
extended federal criminal jurisdiction over all offenses committed
within the Indian country except those offenses committed by one
Indian against another and except those tribes which had treaties to
the contrary. 7 6 This action definitely infringed on any international
relationship, and at the time was questioned in its breadth by some
courts. In 1819, $1o,ooo per year was appropriated toward em-
ployment of teachers for the Indians .'7 This action, which strength-
ened the Cherokee Nation 79 and Kagama'8 ° wardship claims,' 8'
could be explained as merely a grant-in-aid to a friendly sovereign
nation in need, although reflection in retrospect might reveal other-
wise.
Treaty Period
The year 1829 marked the beginning of the treaty period of United
States dealings with Indian tribes. The growing power of Anglo
civilization, marked by the administration of Andrew Jackson, initi-
ated this period, which is characterized by compulsory emigration
under the form of consent by voluntary treaty. 18 2 Although com-
pulsion was new, the policy of removal was not. Efforts were made
in colonial days to remove Indians to unsettled lands in the west.183
In 38o2, Georgia surrendered its claim to western lands to the fed-
eral government in a cession known as the Georgia Compact, which
provided that the United States extinguish Indian title to all lands
in Georgia as soon as possible.8 4 Even the Louisiana Purchase of
1803 was made, according to President Jefferson, with a view of
furnishing a new area for the habitation of eastern Indian tribes.', 5
During this period, the Supreme Court entered the area of policy,
giving landmark decisions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia8 and
Worcester v. Georgia.87 Whatever cruelties may be chargeable to
other governmental branches in this period, the courts always main-
tained the obligations of good faith due the Indians from the fed-
eral government.'88 Although the Court did not accord Indian tribes
the status of independent nations,8 9 it recognized in this era that
Indian tribes were distinct, independent communities under ex-
clusive federal control.10
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The legislative policy prevalent in this period was isolation of the
Indians.' 91 In 1830 Congress made provisions for the exchange of
Indian lands in the East for lands in the West, and for removal of
the Indians involved across the Mississippi River.192 The Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs was created in 1832, to proscribe and man-
age Indian affairs.1 3 To complement that action, Congress created
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1834. 94 After 1837, Indians no longer
received direct payment for lands ceded or sold, as Congress provided
that the proceeds of such sales were to be kept in the Treasury for
Indian benefit." 5 Couched in phrases proclaiming benefit and pro-
tection of Indians, Congress passed other measures which narrowed
the Indians' ability to determine their future, deteriorated tribal
autonomy, and compelled the status of wardship. l Indian nations
became tribes and the gap between them and sovereign nations was
widened in the eyes of Congress and the courts. Finally, in 1871, in
a rider tacked at the end of an Indian appropriations act, Congress
legislated away the Indian tribes' right to contract with the United
States by treaty.1' 7 Thus a new period was ushered in where Indian
tribes were controlled by agreement and statute.' 8
Agreement Period
The end of treating with Indian tribes is illustrative of the struggle
that took place between federal governmental branches in the period
that immediately followed. Congress was in essence struggling for
control of Indian policy and striving to find the best means to attain
such control. The amendment of 1871 narrowed the scope of execu-
tive power over Indian affairs because it ended the executive nego-
tiation of treaty terms with Indian tribes.'99 However, although
executive power was narrowed, it was not yet destroyed because
although treaties were forbidden to be made after March 3, 1871,20
contracted agreements were not and thus such a means was pursued
by the executive branch in an effort to confine Indians on reserva-
tions of ever shrinking dimensions.20 '
It is doubtful that any essential difference between treaty and
agreement was noticed by the Indian tribes. Although certainly the
1871 action of Congress indicates the doctrine of Indian sovereignty
was accorded much less deference by Congress than other federal
governmental branches, 202 this is not to say that the executive branch
honored the letter and spirit of the treaties negotiated. The Indian
tribes were forced by the executive power of the army to keep treaty
and agreement terms, while Anglo settlers invaded their reservations
and broke those terms. 203 When Indians complained, they were
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forced to surrender the part of their lands desired by Anglo settlers
or lose their tribal integrity to the Anglo influx.204 Faced with the
reality of the situation Indian lands shrunk, but tribal integrity and
self-government were maintained. 20 5 Because treaties were so easily
set aside by the compulsion of the Anglo populace, agreements were
no actual step down for Indian tribes. The contract that an agree-
ment embodied was just as powerful and as enforceable as treaties
ratified by Congress. 0 6
In 1883 the Court protected Indian sovereignty by denying federal
court jurisdiction to prosecute the killing of one Indian by an-
other.20 7 Congress, voicing its disapproval of the situation of Indian
justice and directly infringing on inherent Indian sovereignty, ex-
tended federal jurisdiction in 1885 over the seven major offenses of
murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson,
burglary, and larceny committed by one Indian against another in
Indian country.208 This congressional action did not, however, abro-
gate existing treaties and thus those Indian tribes with the foresight
to provide for exclusive Indian jurisdiction were unaffected by that
legislation.20 9
The executive control over Indians accomplished by forced nego-
tiation was contested by Congress in 1871, and won by Congress in
1886 as the Court in United States v. Kagama 10 established Con-
gress as the Indian policy-making power.2 11 Even as early as 1846, it
was implied that Congress could govern Indians by direct legisla-
tion. 12 Kagama, a landmark decision, questioned the validity of the
1885 Seven Major Offenses Act218 and found that Indian people are
subject to the authority of congressional legislation.1 4 Because treaty
abrogation was not an issue, the question of the extent of congres-
sional power was unanswered in Kagama, but Indian self-govern-
ment was held vulnerable to invasion by direct congressional legis-
lation. The decision ended the executive power over the Indian
tribes because the semblance of negotiation was no longer required.
Assimilation Period
Kagama is interpreted by some authors as recognizing a duty on
the part of the federal government to "civilize" the Indian by legis-
lative means.215 Such an interpretation, even if not intended by the
Court, was certainly apprehended by Congress, or so its action re-
flects. From the time it first fought for Indian policy control in 1871,
Congress set as a goal the elimination of Indian tribal structure and
the assimilation of the Indians into Anglo society.2 16 The General
Allotment Act of 1887217 is typical of that goal. It was the first of
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many allotment acts218 which were designed to force individual
ownership of tribal lands so as to terminate the age-old Indian prac-
tice of holding land in common. 19
Allotment in severalty's purpose was to force the Indian to indulge
himself in the habits of "civilized life" and create a surplus of land
for further white settlement 2° The latter conclusion as to purpose
is well supported by the fact that tribal holdings shrank from
155,632,312 acres in 3883 to 52,651,343 acres in 1933.221
During the late i8oo's it was becoming apparent that the property
rights of the Indians were rapidly increasing in pecuniary value.222
In all fairness to Congress, the pressures to open Indian land to
Anglo settlement were tremendous. 228 The welfare of the nation
Congress represented demanded the efficient use of the lands within
its borders and the Indian utilization of those lands not only did not
contribute to this national demand, but represented a hinderance
on it.224 The purpose of the General Allotment Act represented a
confrontation between Indian self-determination and the needs of a
growing nation. The result was that the Act wrecked the land base
of Indian tribes with experience showing that allotted lands and the
Indian soon parted.225
Congress, confronted with the resistance of the tribes to allotment
and the problems which allotments would create,220 became gen-
erally inattentive to Indian matters227 and let allotment proceed at
a moderate pace. The longer complete allotment took, the more
time Congress had to realize that the habits of ten thousand years
could not be repealed by handing the Indians a piece of paper.22 18
Confronted with Anglo society, which was usually discriminatory
and often hostile, the Indian allottee found himself in an environ-
ment to which he could not quickly adjust; consequently, the usual
course of events led to the Indians' loss of lands and an impoverished
condition.2 9
During this assimilation period the judiciary was not silent. Re-
inforcing the Kagama decision, the In re Mayfield23 ° opinion de-
livered in 1891 repeated that Indian tribes were subject in the exer-
cise of their sovereignty to congressional action3.23 Recognizing that
the Court is bound to respect congressional policy and construe all
action in consonance with such policy, the Court determined that
Indian self-government was on the same policy level as assimilation
through "civilization." ' 2 The assimilation attempts of Congress,
pursued chiefly by allotment of lands in severalty and to a lesser
extent by the granting and later imposition of citizenship status on
Indians, 2"3 made congressional policy difficult for the Court to un-
derstand. Thus, in 1905, in the case of In reHeff,234 the Court decided
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that Congress had embarked on a new policy looking toward the
end of the exercise of Indian sovereignty. 35 However, in 1916,
United States v. Nice,"6 which explicitly overruled In re Heff,
pointed out that although the General Allotment Act of 188723' did
contemplate that the tribal relation of Indians was to be dissolved, it
was not to occur when allotments were completed or citizenship
undertaken. It stressed that Congress alone has the power to deter-
mine if, when, and how dissolution will occur. 2 8
The assimilation period represents a time when congressional
policy lacked respect for tribal sovereignty and thus for the tribal
entity. By choosing to deal with Indians on an individual rather than
the traditional tribal basis, Congress attempted immediate induction
of Indians into the Anglo civilization. In its efforts to strip Indians
of their own culture and communal society by allotment acts, the
government seriously infringed on tribal self-determination, integ-
rity, and culture.2 9 The adverse effects of the policy of assimilation
compelled remedial action 4° and brought about a complete reversal
of congressional policy. 241
Present Period
Because the anticipated assimilation of Indians into Anglo society
did not occur,242 and because Indian sovereignty was preferred over
Indian destruction, Congress passed the Wheeler-Howard Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934.243 The Act is the last universally recog-
nized major policy revision dealing with Indians244 and represents
a congressional policy designed to utilize the local self-governing
capacity of Indian tribes.24 5 At least once since 1934 there has been a
serious erosion of that policy, 246 but subsequent action of Congress
indicates that the erosion has been curtailed.
Although held by the Court to be an abrupt change,4' 7 the policy
revision of 1934 was not an overnight project. In 1928 the Meriam
Report, 48 published at the request of Secretary of the Interior Hu-
bert Work,249 pointed out that the two most serious deficiencies in
Indian administration were the exclusion of Indians from managing
their own affairs and the poor quality of public service rendered by
public officials. 250 In 1929 President Hoover appointed a new Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs Commissioner who inaugurated a determined
effort to do away with the major legal discriminations suffered by
Indians. 51 In 1932 Congress passed the Leavitt Act, 252 which can-
celed a mass of debts unjustly attached to Indians by past admin-
istrations for wasteful, unneeded projects. 253 Thus, Congress began
to change its mood at least two years before the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act changed basic Indian policy.
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The Wheeler-Howard Act, passed during the presidency of Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt, could easily be called the "Indian New Deal." 25 4
As an answer to a century of abuse and maltreatment inflicted on a
nearly helpless minority,255 the Act recognized the importance of
the integrity and cohesiveness of the tribe in the social, political,
and economic aspects of Indian life.50 For those tribes who volun-
tarily submit themselves to organization under the Act, substantial
benefits are available. Although election under the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act is purely voluntary, 95 of z72 federally recognized tribes
have been incorporated and chartered pursuant to the Act.25 7 Pro-
visions of the Act 258 include the end of land allotment in severalty,
extension of trust or other protective restrictions on land already
allotted, restoration of surplus lands to tribal ownership, authoriza-
tion of the purchase of new lands for tribes, and the confirmation of
numerous inherently sovereign powers. 25 Through such provisions,
Indian tribal government was strengthened and revitalized with an
eye toward encouraging Indians to retain their communal way of
life and exercise the inherent power of self-government they
possess.2 o
After the 1934 policy of Indian self-determination was inaugu-
rated by Congress, other significant legislation followed. In 1935
Congress set up a special agency to assist Indians in marketing their
native arts and crafts products.2 1 This exemplified the about-face in
Indian policy, for after a century of efforts to eradicate the Indian
culture, Congress was now subsidizing it.212 Congress granted tax
exemptions to Indian homesteads purchased with Indian trust funds
in 1936263 and extended provisions similar to the Wheeler-Howard
Act to Oklahoma tribes, who had been previously exempted.204
The Supreme Court in 1938 recognized that minerals and timber
on Indian lands belonged to Indians and not the government. 205
Congress acted immediately on the basis of that decision and assured
Indians the right to lease their own minerals.200
The year 1940 saw Congress refund taxes that Indians had been
forced to pay when trust-exempt estates were terminated without
Indian consent. 17 Again, in 1941, the Supreme Court construed
Indian land title-holding to be that Indians have legal title to lands
which they had occupied from time immemorial without regard to
formal treaty confirmation.08 In an effort to free Indians from any
burden they might feel from government protection, Congress, in
1948, conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior authority at his
discretion to issue fee patents to land and remove restrictions on
alienation and allotment for those Indian individuals who applied.200
At this point in time Indians could choose in which "civilization"
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or culture they wished to belong 270 Indian tribes still retained
enough sovereign powers to protect themselves and their members,
but for Indian individuals who wished to assimilate with the Anglo
society provisions were made so that the desired assimilation could
be accomplished.
The choice of closer ties with the states and Anglo culture was
available not only to Indian individuals, but to tribes as well. After
consultation by the Bureau of Indian Affairs with the tribes affected,
criminal jurisdiction was transferred to Kansas, 271 North Dakota,2 72
Iowa,27 3 New York,274 and California.27 5 Under this same consulta-
tion method, California obtained civil jurisdiction over one reserva-
tion in 1949278 and in 195o New York obtained civil jurisdiction over
the Indian tribes within its borders. 7 The delegation of civil juris-
diction to a state by the federal government is a serious infringement
on the inherent sovereignty of a tribe, for it withdraws intra-tribal
disputes from tribal determination. Yet, such action is well within
the wardship power278 of the federal government and could be con-
sidered a policy shift away from Indian self-determination. One
prominent author notes such a move from 1948, the time Indian
individuals were allowed to petition for fee patents. 279 However,
congressional action, such as the enlarging of the Rocky Boy's Res-
ervation in Montana in 1950,280 is inconsistent with such a con-
clusion.
Any inconsistencies in congressional action were overcome in 1953
when Public Law 28o was passed.281 The mood of Congress had
definitely changed.282 As an attempt at compromise between wholly
abandoning jurisdiction over Indians to the states and maintaining
them as wards subject only to federal or tribal jurisdiction, 83 the
statute transferred to five states and offered all others civil and crim-
inal jurisdiction over reservation Indians, 284 but did not terminate
trust status.2 85 The legislation was without question an infringement
on Indian sovereignty because jurisdiction was granted to the states
involved and given to those that desired it without regard to tribal
consent.2 0 As compromises often do, Public Law 28o left both the
respective Indian tribes and the states dissatisfied-the Indians due
to lack of state protection and the states because of the inability
to finance their responsibilities in the newly acquired jurisdiction.2 87
In 1954 Congress took even stronger action by passing termination
acts for several tribes2 88 and in 1956 continued the tactic.2 89 In 1958
Alaska was added to the Public Law 280 states which mandatorially
have jurisdiction over Indian tribes. 90
The aforementioned action of Congress was so forceful that one
Supreme Court opinion ventured to recognize it as a new period of
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assimilation.291 Plainly the legislative branch undertook a new direc-
tion in 1953 and some experts view the action as a wearying of the
federal government of its guardianship role.29 2 However, such con-
clusions are not supported by further legislation as the forceful action
came to a standstill. Congress found termination acts were more
easily passed than implemented,"'8 and the response to Public Law
28o by optional states was not great.29 4
Congress failed to produce broad legislation during the early
196o's and not until 1968 was any policy direction implied by legis-
lation. At that time Congress provided in the Civil Rights Act of
1968 actions indicated that no policy of assimilation was in force or
diction without Indian consent and also authorized states to return
jurisdiction to the federal government. 2 6 Actions consistent with
wardship and Indian self-determination continued, for in 1970 the
Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to make loans to tribal cor-
porations established under the Indian Reorganization Act,297 Qua-
paw Indian restrictions were extended an additional 25 years from
1971,298 and the act dealing with final disposition of the Choctaw
Tribe was repealed. 299 In 1972 Indian tribes were authorized to par-
ticipate in federal revenue-sharing funds.30 0 Although these post-
1968 actions indicate that no policy of assimilation was in force or
if in force was terminated, in 1973 doubts were resolved as Congress
repealed the Act terminating the Menominee Indians and rein-
stated all rights and privileges of the tribe.8 0'
Current federal policy is designed to encourage stronger tribal
governments, 02 which was the object of the 1934 policy change. The
shift in congressional mood in the 1950's was relatively short-lived
and had some distressing consequences. 30 But plainly it represents
that Indian tribes are no longer immune from state control as early
Supreme Court decisions intimate.0 4 The early complete exclusion
of states from intercourse with Indian tribes has been undermined
and the pattern of that erosion is not yet clear.8°5
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assume jurisdiction at such time and in such manner as the people of the state shall
by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the state to assumption thereof."
z16. See infra footnote 288, where tribes have been terminated. See also Oliver,
supra note i2, at 21o.
117. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 117 U.S. 553, 556 (1903); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445,
491 (1899).
318. Oliver, supra note 12, at 203.
119. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556 (1903); Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 3o6 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445,
491 (1899).
120. 187U.S. 553 (1903).
121. Id. at 568. "We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in
the dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the legislative
branch of the government exercised its best judgment in the premises. In any event,
as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or in-
quire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury was
occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as implying, by the use made by
Congress of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress
and not to the courts."
122. Oliver, supra note 12, at 210. See Rice, Position of the American Indian in
Law, 16 J. CoMP. LzE. & INT. L. ( 3d ser.) 78, 307 (1934).
123. Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 917 (loth Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 960, reh. denied, 3 57 U.S. 924 (1957).
124. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2: "He [the President] shall have power, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the
senators present concur."
125. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. See supra note 95.
iz6. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558 (1832).
127. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3: "New states may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union; but no new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of
any other state; nor any state be formed by the jurisdiction of two or more states or
parts of states without the consent of the legislatures of the state concerned as well
as of the Congress."
128. The Oklahoma Enabling Act, 34 Stat. 1286 (1907) provides that the people
may adopt a constitution, provided that nothing contained in the constitution shall
be construed to limit or impair the rights of person or property pertaining to the
Indians so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished, or to limit or affect the
authority of the government of the United States to make any law or regulation
respecting such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights by treaties, agreement,
law, or otherwise, which it would have been competent to make if the Act had never
been passed. This reservation of the authority of Congress to legislate in the future
respecting Indians has been held constitutional, Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1912 ).
And the broad power of Congress to interfere with the affairs of Oklahoma tribes and
their property has been recognized since statehood in numerous cases. See Bunch v.
Cole, 263 U.S. 250 (1923); Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911). See
also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 6o (1962), which discusses the
effect of the Alaska Enabling Act on the federal relationship with Alaska tribes. For
other enabling acts preserving federal control over Indians and their lands, see 28
Stat. lo9 (1894) (Utah); 36 Stat. 557 (1910) (New Mexico); 25 Stat. 676 (1889)
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(South Dakota, Washington, North Dakota and Montana); 36 Stat. 557, 568, 579
(191o) (Arizona).
129. The federal treaty power has been deemed exclusive since constitutional
ratification. Truly, any effort on the part of a state to make an alliance with a foreign
or even a domestic power (Indians) in the nature of a treaty would be viewed as
void by the federal government and possibly even an act of rebellion.
13 o . American Indian, supra note 71, at 662.
131. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); United States v. Holliday, 70
U.S. 407 (1865).
132. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407 (1865).
133. 2 4 1 U.S. 591 (1916).
134. Id. at 597-98.
135. 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886).
136. Oliver, supra note 12, at 196.
137. 30U.S. ( 5 Pet.) 1 (1931).
138. 18 U.S. 37 5 (1886).
139. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
140. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27 (a886).
142. Id. at 37-38. It is notorious historical fact that great pressure has been
brought upon Indians, not so much for their benefit as to effectuate other policies
of the United States.
142. Wardship extends to authorize the United States to exercise the power to
legislate in favor of Indians to a state's detriment. Minnesota v. United States, 125
F.2d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1942).
143. United States v. Kagama, 1.8 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). "It seems to us that
this is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely
for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to
the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power."
144. 318 U.S. 705 (1943).
145. Id.at 715.
146. Id. See also Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 22 U.S. 286, 31O (1911); United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886):
147. Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911). "Taking these deci-
sions together, it may be taken as the settled doctrine of this court that Congress, in
pursuance of the long established policy of the government, has a right to determine
for itself when the guardianship which has been maintained over the Indian shall cease.
It is for that body, and not the courts, to determine when the true interests of the
Indian require his release from such condition of tutelage."
148. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
149. Id. at 218.
150. Oliver, supra note i2, at 241.
15. 87 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1974); 87 Stat. 429, 430-33 (1973); 86 Stat. 5o8,
509-12 (1972); 85 Stat. 45 (1971); 85 Stat. 231-32, 241-42 (1971); 84 Stat. 669,
670-72, 683, 686 (1970); 83 Stat. 147, 148, 161-62 (1969); 83 Stat. 447, 449
(1969); 82 Stat. 307, 315 (1968); 82 Stat. 425, 440-41 (1968); 82 Stat. 1190, 1195
(1968); 81 Stat. 59, 61-62, 73 (1967); 81 Stat. 783, 788, 8o4, 807 (1968); 8o Stat.
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143, 155 (1966); 8o Stat. 814 (1966); 8o Stat. 903 (1966); 8o Stat. 1057, 1059-6o
(1966); 8o Stat. 1191 (1966).
152. Brader v. James, 246 U.S. 88, 96 (1918); Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 757
(1886).
153. Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 757 (1886).
154. 19 7 U.S. 4 88 (1905).
155. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 559, 6oi (1966). See also Rice v. Olson,
324 U.S. 786 (1945); Brader v. James, 246 U.S. 88 (1918); Tiger v. Western Inv.
Co., 221 U.S. 307 (1911).
156. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 559, 6oi (1916). See text at notes 233-239.
157. American Indian, supra note 71.
158. Braderv. James, 246 U.S. 88, 96 (1918).
159- 43 Stat. 253 (1924); 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). See infra note 233.
16o. American Indian, supra note 71, at 655. The Indian is, "(i) a member of a
tribe which is treated for many purposes as if it were a foreign sovereign, (z) a 'ward'
of the federal government, and (3) a United States citizen." U.S. CoMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, Rep. No. 5, JUSTICE 125 (1961).
161. 25 U.S.C. § 741 (1954). See infra note 288 for tribal termination legislation.
162. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832).
163. Higgins, International Law Consideration of the American Indian Nations
by the United States, 3 ARiz. L. REV. 74-75 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Higgins];
American Indian, supra note 71, at 656.
164. American Indian, supra note 71, at 656.
165. See PRucHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1-50
(1961).
166. OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN
LAw, 138-214 (1958).
167. See Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek with Choctaw Nation, 7 Stat. 333, 334
(1831); Treaty of Hopewell with Cherokees, 7 Stat. 18 (1785); Treaty with Chero-
kees, 7 Stat. 39, (1792); Treaty with Six Nations, 7 Stat. 15 (1784). These treaties
recognized the power to make war, provided for prisoner exchange, and fixed hostage
provisions.
.68. Treaty with Chickasaws, 7 Stat. 450 (1834).
169. Treaty with Creek Nation, 7 Stat. 35 (1790); Treaty with Cherokees, 7 Stat.
39 (1792)- See also COHEN, supra note I, at ch. 4, § 6.
17o. Treaty with Cherokees, 7 Stat. 39 (1792); Treaty of Hopewell, 7 Stat. 13
(1785).
171. Constitutional Rights, supra note 63, at 127; Higgins, supra note 163, at 85.
172. Abbott, Indians and the Law, 2 HARv. L. REV. 167 (1888) [hereinafter cited
as Abbott].
173. American Indian, supra note 71, at 656.
174. 1 Stat. 137 (1790). The statute provided for trade licenses between United
States territories and that occupied by Indians. See also I Stat. 329 (1795); 1 Stat.
452 (1796); 1 Stat. 743 (1799); 2 Stat. 139 (18o2); 2 Stat. 402 (18o6).
175. Higgins, supra note 163, at 85.
176- 3 Stat. 383 (1817).
177. Oliver, supra note 12, at 199.
178- 3 Stat. 516 (1819).
179. 3o U.S. ( 5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
18o. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
181. Oliver, supra note 12, at 199.
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182. Abbott, supra note 172, at 171. By the i8oo's the eastern Indians had begun
to complain to the federal government of the infringement of Anglo settlers who were
stealing their livestock, trespassing, and settling on their land. It was initially out of
sympathy to Indian claims and the inability of the federal government to protect their
interests that treaties of removal were offered. But only a few, if any, Indians actually
desired removal and although removal treaties were eventually signed, removal did
not take place voluntarily. Andrew Jackson, being an Indian fighter, did not hesitate
to move the Indians against their will and thus began an important era in Indian
history. From the Jackson administration forward, the idea of strict observance of
Indian treaties faded. As often as not Indians were forced to move to prescribed
areas different and distant from treaty honored hunting grounds. See also Higgins,
supra note 163, at 82. See also Swindler, supra note 23.
183. Laws of Colonial and State Governments Relating to Indians and Indian
Affairs (1833). See also PRUCHA, AMiERICA INDIAN PoLicy IN THE FORMATIVE
YEARs (1961).
184. DALE & ALDRICH, HISTORY OF OKLAIOMA 93 (3969).
185. Id.
186. 3oU.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
187. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
188. Abbott, supra note 172, at 71-
189. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
19o. Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)-
191. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 6o, 71-72 (1962).
192. 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
193. 4 Stat. 564 (1932).
194. 4 Stat. 735 (1834)-
195. 5 Stat. 135 (1837).
196. Oliver, supra note 12, at 200; Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 242; American
Indian, supra note 71, at 66o-63.
197- 16 Stat. 570 (1871), which provides that "no Indian nation or tribe within
the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an inde-
pendent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty;
but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation
or tribe prior to March 3, 187i, shall be invalidated or impaired."
198. Constitutional Rights, supra note 63, at 127.
199. Abbott, supra note 172, at 173.
2oo. 16 Stat. 51o (387). See note 196.
201. Abbott, supra note 172.
202. American Indian, supra note 71, at 659.
203. MAMYPENNY, OUR INDIAN WARs 416 (i88o); Oliver, supra note 12, at 201.
204. Id.
205. Id.
2o6. In considering whether an agreement provision has been superceded by a gen-
eral law, an agreement is accorded the same status as a special law. Marlin v. Lewallen,
276 U.S. 58, 67 (1928); Washington v. Miller, 235 U.S. 422 (1914). And in Dick
v. United States, 2o8 U.S. 340, 359 (1908) the Court determined that a prohibition
against liquor contained in an 1893 Nez Perce agreement was a "valid regulation based
upon the treaty-making power of the United States and upon the power of Congress
to regulate commerce with those Indians."
207. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, (1883). Crow Dog had made the amends
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demanded by Indian customs for his act, but federal authorities pursued an indict-
ment for murder. See I HAAS, THE INDIAN AND THE LAW 4 (1949).
208. 23 Stat. 385 (1885). Congress added incest, assault with a deadly weapon,
and robbery in 47 Stat. 337 (1932), bringing the total to io major crimes. Em-
bezzlement or theft from tribal funds was added in 70 Stat. 792 (1956). See also 18
U.S.C. §§ 1153, 1163 (1970).
2o9. Treaty of Hopewell with Cherokees, 7 Stat. 18 (1785). As late as 1897 a
Cherokee won reversal of a murder conviction on grounds the United States lackcd
iurisdiction in Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897). See also Oliver, supra
note 12, at 202.
210. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
211. Abbott, supra note 172, at 173.
212. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846).
213. 23 Stat. 385 (1885).
214. United Statesv. Kagama, i18 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
215 Constitutional Rights, supra note 63, at 129.
216. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 117-19, 395 (1958);
Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 293; Abbott, supra note 172, at 174.
217. 24 Stat. 388 (1887). The General Allottment Act of 1887 had three prin-
ciple provisions: (1) individual citizenship to Indians who took allotted lands, (z)
individual Indian ownership of allotted land, and (3) sale of surplus reservation land
after allotment. See also PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMIATIVE
YEARS 44-50, 238 (1961).
218. Amendments to the allotment system as established by the General Allotment
Act, supra note 217, were as follows: 26 Stat. 794 (1891); 28 Stat. 386 (1894); 28
Stat. 641 (1895); 36 Stat. 269 (191o). In 27 Stat. 612, 645 (1893) Congress in-
augurated a policy of the allotment of the lands of the Five Civilized Tribes in Okla-
homa. The allotment acts for these tribes were embodied in various agreements:
Cherokee Agreement, 32 Stat. 716 (1902); Choctaw and Chickasaw Agreement, 30
Stat. 495, 505-13 (1848); Creek Agreements, 31 Stat. 861 (1901); 32 Stat. 5oo
(1902); Seminole Agreement, 30 Stat. 567, 568 (1848). These agreements were
supplemented by a volume of legislation, COHEN, supra note 1, at 435-38. See also
Osage Allotment, 34 Stat. 439 (19o6); 25 U.S.C. § 331-58 (1970).
219. Individual rights in occupancy of communal tribal lands have been described
as follows: While tribal members had vested equitable rights to their just share of
communal lands as against strangers and fellow members of their tribes, they had no
separate or individual right to or equity in any of those lands which they could
maintain against the legislation of the United States or tribal legislation, Cherokee
Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1902); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S.
445 (1899). The tribes with respect to tribal land were not limited by rights of
occupancy which the tribe itself might grant to its members, and the occupancy of
tribal land did not create any vested rights in the occupant as against the tribe.
Sizemore v. Brady, 235 U.S. 444 (1914); Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 540 (1911).
220. COHEN, supra note I, at 78. See also Oliver, supra note 12, at 234; OTIS,
THE DAWEs ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (1972).
221. U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENsUS, DEP'T OF COMMIERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE U.S. 180 (1955).
222. Abbott, supra note 172, at 175.
223. American Indian, supra note 71, at 663.
224. Abbott, supra note 172, at 236.
225. Oliver, supra note 12, at 236.
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226. Abbott, supra note 172, at 375-79"
227. Jurisdiction, supra note 1 3, at 293.
228. Oliver, supra note 12, at 236.
229. Id.
230. 141 U.S. 107 (1891).
231. Id. at liz.
232. Id. at 35-.6. "The policy of Congress has evidently been to vest in the
inhabitants of the Indian country such power of self-government as was thought to
be consistent with the safety of the white population with which they may have come
in contact, and to encourage them as far as possible in raising themselves to our
standard of civilization."
233. In addition to special statutes, such as the Indian Territory Naturalization Act,
26 Stat. 81, 99-1oo (189o), which provided for application for naturalization by
members of particular tribes, there were general statutes naturalizing allottees, see 24
Stat. 388, 390 (1887), as amended by 34 Stat. 182 (19o6). There were also general
statutes which naturalized women -who married United States citizens, 25 Stat. 392
(1888), 25 U.S.C. § 182 (1970), and which naturalized Indian men who enlisted to
fight in the First World War, 41 Stat. 350 (1919). In .924 Congress gave a general
grant of citizenship to Indians born in the United States, 43 Stat. 253 (1924), but
this act was repealed by 54 Stat. 1137, 1138 (1940), which enacted a similar pro-
vision, see 8 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1970).
234. 19 7 U.S. 4 88 (1905).
235. Id. at494-
236. 241 U.S. 559 (1916).
237. 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
238. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 559, 598"6o1 (1916).
239. Constitutional Rights, supra note 63, at 236.
240. Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 293.
241. Oliver, supra note 12, at 203.
242. Jurisdiction, supra note 13, at 293-
243. 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
244. Oliver, supra note 3., at 203.
245. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 73 (1962).
246. Id. See also Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights 1950-1953: A Case Study
in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
247. Id.
248. MERIAM ET AL. THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928).
249. Cohen, supra note 246, at 348.
250. MERIAM ET AL. THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928). See also
COHEN, supra note i, at 26-27, 83-97.
251. Cohen, supra note 246, at 348.
252. 4 7 Stat. 564 (1932)-
253. Cohen, supra note 246, at 349-
254. Oliver, supra note 12, at 202.
255. American Indian, supra note 71, at 664.
256. Id.
257. Haas, Legal Aspects of Indian Affairs from 1887-1957, 311 ANNALS 12, 19
(1957).
258. Oliver, supra note 12, at 203.
259. Margold, supra note i. According to this authority, tribal powers of internal
sovereignty are vested in tribes under existing law within the meanings of Section 16
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of the Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), which provides: "In addi-
lion to all powers vested in any Indian tribes or tribal council by existing law, the
constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council the
following rights and powers .... Thus this provision protects such vested powers, and
the manner of their exercise may be expressly defined or limited by the terms of a
constitution adopted by a tribe and approved by the Secretary of Interior.
260. Oliver, supra note 12, at 236.
261. 49Stat.891 (i 9 3 5 );25U.S.C.§ 3o5 (1970).
262. Cohen, supra note 246, at 350.
263- 49 Stat. 1532 (1936), as amended by 50 Stat. 188 (1937); 25 U.S.C. § 412a
(1976).
264. Provisions in the Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934), explicitly ex-
cluded Oklahoma tribes from coverage in sections 2, 4, 7, 16, and 17. The Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act, 49 Stat. 1967 (1936), provided for the acquisition of land for
agriculture and grazing, a preference to the Secretary of Interior in buying restricted
land, the right to organize and incorporate as a tribe or as a cooperative association,
loans to the corporations or associations, the sharing of Wheeler-Howard Act funds
with Oklahoma tribes, and a provision excepting Osage County from the provisions
of the Act.
265. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. '1' (1938). See also Cohen,
Original Indian Title, 32 MiNN. L. REv. 28, 54-55 (1947)"
266. 52 Stat. 347 (1938).
267- 54 Stat. 298 (19 4o), amended 56 Stat. 87 (1942).
268. United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). See also Cohen,
Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. R-v. 28, 54-55 (1947).
269. 62 Stat. 236 (1948).
270. Goldberg, Public Law 28o: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reserva-
tion Indians, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 535, 540 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg].
See also The New York Indian's Right to Self Determination, 22 BUFrALO L. REv.
985 (1973).
271. 54 Stat. 249 (1940). Kansas was given criminal jurisdiction over all Indians
residing within its borders. The statute continues federal jurisdiction over offenses
defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian
reservations. This statute was repealed by 62 Stat. 1161 (1948) and jurisdiction is now
-covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3234 (1970).
272. 6o Stat. 229 (1946). North Dakota was given criminal jurisdiction over
Devil's Lake Reservation. The statute continues federal jurisdiction over offenses
-defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian
reservations.
273. 62 Stat. 3161 (1948). Iowa was given criminal jurisdiction over all Indians
residing within its borders. The statute continues federal jurisdiction over offenses
defined by the laws of the United States committed by or against Indians on Indian
-reservations.
274. 62 Stat. 1224 (1948). New York was given criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians residing within its borders.
275. 63 Stat. 705 (1949). California was given criminal and civil jurisdiction over
the Agua Caliente Reservation.
276. Id.
277. 64 Stat. 845 (1950). The act contains a provision allowing the governing
bodies of New York tribes to declare those tribal laws and customs which they desire
-to preserve, which will be published in the Federal Register and govern in all civil
340
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cases involving reservation Indians when the subject matter of such tribal laws and
customs is involved, and provides: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
prevent such courts from recognizing and giving effect to any tribal law or custom
which may be proven to the satisfaction of such courts. .. ." The act also protects
Indian lands from taxation, execution sales, and alienation, protects hunting and
fishing rights. In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 663, 68o
(1974), the Court noted that during consideration of this legislation, "both federal
and state officials agreed that the bill would retain ultimate federal power over the
Indians and that federal guardianship, particularly with respect to property rights,
would continue." For discussion of this legislation, see The New York Indians' Right
to Self-Determination, zz BUFFALo L. REV. 985 (1973) and 25 U.S. 332 (1970).
278. United States v. Kagama, 318 U.S. 375 (1886).
279. Oliver, supra note 12, at 237.
280. 64Stat. 463 (1950).
281. 67 Stat. 588-90 (1953). The act protected Indian "right, privilege, or im-
munity afforded under federal treaty, agreement, or statute, with respect to hunting,
trapping, or fishing, or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 162
(1970); 28 U.S.C. § 136o (1970). See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832).
282. Oliver, supra note 12, at 237.
283. Goldberg, supra note 270, at 537.
284. 67 Stat. 588 et seq. (1953); 28 U.S.C. § 136o (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1162
(1970). The five states were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wis-
consin. The Red Lake of Minnesota, Warm Springs of Oregon, Menominees of
Wisconsin were all excepted from the Act's provisions, though the Menominees were
later subjected to state jurisdiction in 68 Stat. 795 (1954). See S. REP. No. 2223,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See also Oliver, supra note 12, at 238-45.
285. 28 U.S.C. § 246o(b) (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1970). In 1954 an act
was passed providing for the termination of the federal trust relationship as to property
of mixed blood Utes in Utah, making federal legislation inapplicable to them, making
them ineligible for federal services, and making state law applicable to them. 68 Stat.
868 (1954).
286. 67 Stat. 588 et seq. (1953).
287. Goldberg, supra note 270, at 538, 551-58. "Local governments acquiring
jurisdiction were required to hire more police, more judges, more prison guards, more
probation and parole officers, and more juvenile aid officers, and to build new police
stations, courthouses, and jails.... The new resources available to the states under
PL 28o such as fines and court costs were clearly inadequate; estimates based on
federal experience indicated such funds would cover only about io percent of all
newly-acquired law enforcement expenses.... Financial hardship for the states trans-
lated into inadequate law enforcement for the reservations."
288. 68 Stat. 250 (1954), 25 U.S.C. § 891-902 (1976) (Menominee Indian Tribe);
68 Stat. 718 (1954), 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1970) (Klamath Indian Tribe); 68 Stat. 724
(1954), 25 U.S.C. § 691 et seq. (1970) (Western Oregon Indian tribes); 68 Stat.
868 (1954) (Ute Indian Tribe); 68 Stat. 1o99 (1954), 25 U.S.C. § 841 et seq.
(1970) (Ottawa Tribe of Northeast Oklahoma).
289. 70 Stat. 545 (1958), amending i8 U.S.C. § 1162. Some Indian country in
Alaska was later exempted from state jurisdiction by 84 Stat. 1358 (1970).
290. Id.
291. Organized Village of Kakev. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
292. Oliver, supra note 12, at 241.
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293. Expenses were great and required appropriations legislation for the expenses
and delays were not uncommon. For example, see 71 Stat. 26o (1957); 71 Stat. 347
(1957); 72 Stat. 158 (1958); 7z Stat. 29o (1958); 73 Stat. 95 (1959); 74 Stat. 867
(196o).
294. See Goldberg, supra note 270.
295. 25 U.s.c. § 1321-26 (1970). The Act also protected Indian hunting and
fishing rights from state control.
296. 25 U.s.C. § 1326 (1970). Also in the 1968 Civil Rights Act, Congress sub-
jected tribes to limitations known as the Indian Bill of Rights, discussed supra. See
25 U.S.C. § 130z (1970).
297. 84 Stat. 120 (1970); 25 U.S.C. § 488 et seq. (1970).
298. 84 Stat. 325 (1970).
299. 84 Stat. 828 (1970).
3oo. 86 Stat. 925 (197 2); 31 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970).
301. 87 Stat. 770 (1973); 25 U.S.C. § 903 (Supp. III 1973).
302. Goldberg, supra note 27o, at 594. In 1971 Congress acknowledged a policy
of Indian self-determination in Senate Concurrent Resolution z6, passed on Decem-
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